Diesel prices are high, here's why they might go higher

SightSpinner Team ·

Diesel prices are high, here's why they might go higher

Update On October 2, 2026 the US and EU agreed to release 100 million barrels of crude and refined products. This model and charts were updated to reflect the new data.

Gasoline is what gets us humans from A to B and so it's very noticeable when there are even relatively small changes in price. We might glance at the diesel price at the station when filling up our own tank, but that's someone else's problem, so we don't pay as much attention to it. Unfortunately for us it is very much our problem; it's just not as obvious. Diesel is not only what gets things from A to B to C as it makes its way around the global economy, but also what is most used in the 'creation' of those things: tractors, construction machinery, power generation, etc. By the time that hamburger has landed on your dinner plate, all of these steps: growing the food, growing the cattle, transporting the meat, etc. have an added 'diesel tax'. When there is a spike in price, like the one we are dealing with now, the best case scenario is the consumer/supply chain absorb the extra cost. However if it stays high, or worse, goes higher, this can actually make it not economically viable to continue producing, which leads to scarcity and thus even higher downstream costs. And this is the scenario that has everyone so freaked out right now, as it can quickly spiral into the economy at large.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the fall of Mocha and Perim contributed to pushing the average US diesel price to $6.5276/gal on September 22. How much should we be worried? How much of this is speculation vs. fundamentals? Under what circumstances could it get better or, god forbid, worse?

Model

The model is built from the ground up using publicly available data from EIA, FRED, and IMF PortWatch chokepoints. It models both the demand side and the supply side with a simple feedback mechanism to account for potential demand destruction.

Chokepoints and supply destruction

High diesel prices are not entirely due to recent events. The industry has been shifting away from building robust supply lines and infrastructure investment due to the expectation of weaker long-term demand. However, the recent spike can almost entirely be attributed to the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. Some of that is driven by speculation but a large foundation of that is fundamentals. The chokepoints of Hormuz, Mocha/Perim and the East-West pipeline have greatly disrupted the supply.

Meanwhile the Russia-Ukraine war has caused almost unprecedented global refining capacity destruction. Russia is the world's 4th largest diesel exporter and under normal operations accounts for around 10% of global diesel trading. Ukraine has, however, knocked out nearly half of its refining capacity, and looks quite capable of keeping that disruption going for the foreseeable future.

Benchmark Scenarios

We map out some possible futures by extrapolating the current trends from the drivers up to the diesel price for several benchmarks (defined in the table below). Best case scenario we're looking at continued elevation into next year, leveling out at a still elevated but bearable ~$4.5/gal around a year from now. Not an ideal scenario, but potentially weatherable for diesel-heavy industries. In the worst case, we are looking at near $7/gallon with essentially no reduction in price in the near term.

Barring some rather large developments in the Middle East and/or Ukraine, those reliant on diesel are looking like they'll need to endure for some time.

Driver De-escalation Baseline Escalation Maximum stress
Hormuz closure index → 0.10 by Mar-27, then 0.08 holds 0.97 1.0 Oct-Dec-26, then ≥0.97 1.0 all year
Bab el-Mandeb closure index → 0.10 holds 0.71 0.85 1.0 from Oct-26
Gulf production shut-in → 0% by Oct-26 eases to 9% up to 24% peak peak 25%, holds 20%
Gulf refining damage none none none → 15% by Dec-26
Russia refining offline → 15% holds 50% → 60% by Jun-27 → 60% by Dec-26
Distillate days-of-supply loosens to 30.5 28.9 + seasonal tightens to 26.0 tightens to 24.5
SPR releases none 10M bbl/mo 30M bbl/mo Oct-26–Mar-27 40M bbl/mo Oct-26–Mar-27, then 20M/mo (floor 95M, ~exhausted Feb-27)
Macro backdrop recovery (production/trucking up, rates −0.08/mo) steady (+0.15/mo, FX 1.158) stagflation (production −0.10/mo, rates rise) recession (production −0.30/mo, trucking −2.5k/mo, rates +0.10/mo)

Data Sources

  • EIA API v2: US retail diesel prices (monthly and weekly), Brent and WTI spot prices, refinery utilization and operable capacity, SPR and crude stocks, distillate production/supplied/ending stocks, and the STEO diesel forecast used as the benchmark.
  • FRED: federal funds rate, industrial production, trucking employment, USD/EUR exchange rate, CPI.
  • IMF PortWatch: daily transit counts for the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal (Sep 2026 month-to-date, annualized and flagged).
  • Event series (cited in the relevant components): Russian refining capacity offline % (Reuters, Ukraine General Staff, Bloomberg, IEA run estimates), Gulf production shut-in % (war reporting, including the Sep 11 East-West Pipeline shutdown), SPR/IEA coordinated release events (Nov 2021, Mar 2022, Mar 2026), and the AAA daily national average ($6.5107 on 2026-09-21) as a cross-check on the weekly-blended September figure.

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